Recently, a number of political reform advocates and advocacy groups have proposed a form of proportional representation (“PR”) for the U.S. House. In the view of reform advocates, our system of single-member election districts and first-past-the-post elections is a major reason for our increasingly tribalistic politics and toxic political culture. The proposed cure is the creation of a five- or six-party Congress, which would be enabled by electing Congress from multi-member districts of five to seven members.
This article reflects skepticism about this proposal. The essay first shows the full range of changes to Congress and the voting system that would be required to institutionalize this proposal. A transition to multi-member districts is not like flicking a switch; it would require numerous other accompanying changes. The article then turns to a comparative perspective to take issue with the proposal.
This comparative perspective questions whether the diagnosis PR proponents offer to motivate their proposal is even accurate. Other democracies that use our same election system do not have our tribalistic politics and levels of affective polarization. This strongly suggests that other factors about the distinct way American politics is institutionally structured, along with distinct features of American society and culture, are the source of our current political ailments. The article then turns to the most important challenge it raises: whether the proposed PR cure is worse than the disease. By exploring the extraordinarily turbulent actual multi-party governments that exist today in Western Europe, the article argues that a five- or six-party Congress would make the political process even more dysfunctional than it is today.
The ability to deliver effective government is the most important challenge democracies face today. The article concludes, based on comparative experience, that PR would make it even harder for Congress to meet this challenge.
* Sudler Family Professor of Constitutional Law, NYU School of Law. A portion of this article appears in Richard H. Pildes, The Neglected Value of Effective Government, ___ U. Chi. L.F. __ (forthcoming 2024). I am grateful for comments I received at an NYU faculty workshop. Thanks to Lee Drutman, Scott Mainwaring, Soren Dayton, Rick Hasen, and Jack Santucci for assistance. For research assistance, I thank Jonathan Wampler and Keton Kakkar.
The full text of this Symposium is available to download as a PDF.