Abortions are difficult both mentally and physically on women; abortions may be even more difficult when a woman decides to terminate a pregnancy because she knows her baby will have a specific trait causing the baby to die shortly after birth. Trait-specific abortions occur, though not without controversy. In the states that still legally allow abortions, trait-specific abortions are not always permitted. Prior to Dobbs, a circuit split existed regarding the legality of trait-specific abortions. Some states permitted trait-specific abortions, while others did not. Since Dobbs, the circuit split no longer exists, though the opinions may still influence future state action regarding the legality of trait-specific abortions. The central issue—whether trait-specific abortions are immoral and should be prohibited—remains prevalent in society.
This Note argues that at its core, trait-specific abortions are merely just a type of abortion; thus, if the state permits abortions generally, trait-specific abortions should be treated no differently. While this Note acknowledges Dobbs and its impact, it also analyzes the previous circuit split with a pre-Dobbs framework. Ultimately, this Note seeks to demonstrate that the issues regarding the ethics and legal considerations of trait-specific abortions are not necessarily black and white.
* J.D. Candidate, 2023, University of Illinois College of Law; B.A., 2020, Wake Forest University. Thank you to the members, staff, and editors of the University of Illinois Law Review for their sup-port, guidance, and hard work. As this Note was originally written prior to Dobbs, I would also like to thank Professor Suja Thomas for helping me rework my Note this past year. Finally, a huge thank you to my family for all of their love and support.
The full text of this Note is available to download as a PDF.