Utility model patents, aimed at galvanizing incremental innovation, inherently feature a lower inventiveness threshold compared to standard patents. China’s patent legal framework and its enforcement have significantly contributed to the nation’s modernization, with patent applications witnessing a dramatic surge over recent decades. Nevertheless, patent quality—more pivotal to realizing legislative objectives such as technological upgrading—has been compromised by a substantial influx of low-quality patents, predominantly utility model patents. In response, multi-tiered targeted institutional reforms have been formulated and implemented. Notably, the Implementation Rules of the Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China, effective January 20, 2024, explicitly integrated provisions governing examinations for “manifestly deficient in inventiveness” in utility model patent applications. Concurrent with the formal institutional entrenchment of elevated inventiveness thresholds, a statistically discernible downward trajectory in the number of granted utility model patents had materialized in China by the conclusion of 2025. Looking ahead, as China’s opening-up advances to greater sophistication, its economic and trade engagements with foreign nations and regions will grow increasingly intertwined, fostering a constellation of transnational ramifications related to utility model patents unfolding both domestically and externally.
Key words: Transnational Ramifications, Inventiveness Threshold, Utility Model Patents, China’s opening-up
Introduction
Today, most economies worldwide have established patent law systems, and the top five Patent Offices account for 85% of the world’s total patent applications.1 Conceptually, unpacking the notions of patent and utility model patent (hereinafter “UMP”) may seem straightforward, yet these concepts carry multifaceted positive and normative values. For instance, the theoretical rationale for UMPs stems from two key facts: a variety of social welfare-enhancing inventions are cumulative in nature, and many of them fail to meet normal patentability criteria because the novelty and inventive step requirements of the patent system are too high to accommodate them.2 Accordingly, the inventive step required for utility models has always been lower than that for patents, which constitutes a cardinal incentive for filing a utility model application.3 In general, medium-sized and small industrial factories show particular interest in such protection, primarily because it can provide legal safeguards for their products.4 By contrast, large enterprises seldom utilize utility model protection or engage with it.5
Today, the patent system6 is increasingly playing a key role in encouraging innovation, promoting technological achievements, facilitating international technical exchanges, and driving economic development. By recognizing and protecting inventors’ intellectual achievements, this system operates in numerous economies, and China7 is no exception. The patent law system and its enforcement have made significant contributions to China’s modernization. Over the past few decades, the number of patent applications has experienced a dramatic increase.8 To some extent, the sharp rise in granted patents has mirrored the rapid development of China’s contemporary science, technology, and economy. However, the quantitative aspect is far from the sole determinant, as the number of granted patents represents merely one of the indicators of innovation capability and performance.9
In contrast to the quantity of patent applications and grants, the quality of granted patents has proven more pertinent to realizing the legislative purpose of patent law—such as technological upgrading. Unfortunately, the surge in granted patents in China has included a significant number of low-quality patents10 with unwarranted authorizations, severely undermining the intended legislative objectives.11 Specifically, these low-quality patents consist mainly of UMPs, often dubbed “junk patents.”
Dating back to April 1, 1985, when China formally enacted its first Patent Law,12 the country initiated a legal protection system for UMPs. After four revisions of the Patent Law, China’s utility model patent legal framework (hereinafter referred to as “CUMP”) has been significantly improved.13 However, it appears that not all authorized utility model patents fully satisfy the statutory inventiveness requirements. Such cases of socially detrimental patents have attracted substantial attention, particularly domestically.14 As a result, China has been formulating measures—including a seemingly more stringent non-obviousness standard currently under development—to gradually enhance patent quality.15
This Article first elucidates the unprecedented overhaul of the CUMP legal system, which is centered on inventiveness, and the fundamental rationale deeply rooted in China’s latest general development strategy for innovation-driven institutional construction. This framework serves as the foundation and backdrop for an in-depth analysis of the recent cross-border implications of raising the inventiveness threshold for CUMPs. To align more closely with CUMP-based scenarios, Part I explores the basic evolutionary background of the CUMP Legal System, primarily including institutional factors related to the initiation of the customized CUMP legal system, the essential institutional driving forces behind it, and subsequent institutional improvements. Building on the preceding analyses, Part II examines the unprecedented institutional amendment to raise the threshold of inventiveness. Prior to concluding, Part III examines the transnational ramifications of elevating the inventiveness threshold for CUMPs amid the increasing sophistication of China’s opening-up initiatives.
I. Basic Evolutionary Background of the CUMP Legal System
A. Fundamental Institutional Drivers of the CUMP Legal System
The institutional design of UMP systems remains within the purview of individual jurisdictions, guided by their specific policy priorities and developmental needs. By contrast, while utility models are scarcely integrated into the IP frameworks of developed nations—given their focus on protecting innovations of moderate inventiveness—they serve as a strategic tool in many developing economies to foster domestic technological capabilities.16
Beyond the U.S.-driven transplantation trajectory, the Chinese Patent Law has also drawn inspiration from the German Patent Law, particularly in the realm of utility model regulations.17 In fact, the introduction of utility model protection in China was preceded by robust deliberations. Legislative debates brought to the forefront concerns that safeguarding incremental innovations would disproportionately advance the interests of Japan’s industrial sectors, which then held a significant competitive advantage in incremental technological refinements.18 Stated otherwise, China harbored apprehensions about formulating UMP legislation that might inadvertently prioritize foreign industrial interests over domestic innovators.
In its 1984 Patent Law, China first instituted the utility model patent protection system.19 The decision to incorporate a utility model legal mechanism into the PRC’s nascent patent legislation entailed a complex interplay of advantages and limitations. The CUMP’s relatively low inventiveness threshold enabled technological adapters (rather than original innovators) to legally secure protection for incremental technical improvements that would otherwise fall outside the scope of patent law.20
The fundamental statutory rationale of the CUMP legal system has also gained international recognition.21 This explains, in theoretical terms, why UMPs are referred to by quasi-synonymous terms such as “Second Tier Patent”22 in other jurisdictions. Given the inherently lower inventiveness threshold, CUMP grants typically bypass substantive examination—a design choice intended to alleviate the Patent Office’s overburdened workload in reviewing massive patent applications.23 Particularly, during the early phase of China’s patent system, it is plausible to argue that while the majority of patents were awarded to foreign entities, utility model registrations primarily benefited domestic innovators.24 More specifically, a significant proportion of early-stage Chinese patent applications—particularly those for utility models—lacked corresponding foreign filings in English.25
Notably, this phenomenon is not exclusive to China. For instance, alongside China, nations such as South Korea, Japan, and Germany have been among those that most extensively utilized utility models, with applicants predominantly of domestic origin.26 This practice has given rise to the perception that numerous readily acquirable yet potentially contestable monopoly rights constitute an effective strategy for domestic enterprises to fend off foreign imports and secure their domestic market dominance.27
B. Subsequent Institutional Enhancements to the CUMP Legal System
1. Patent law amendments
The 1992 first amendment lengthened the statutory term of CUMPs to ten years (from the original five years), thereby substantially strengthening their legal protection.28 The 2008 Patent Law revision introduced the absolute novelty standard for both utility models and invention patents,29raising the substantive requirements threshold for utility model applications. Notably, this amendment also permitted applicants to file concurrent applications for a utility model and an invention patent based on the same technical solution, enabling the utility model to complement the temporary protection measures for invention patent applications.30
Subsequent to this, the 2010 revision of the Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Chinese Patent Law further broadened the scope of preliminary examination for utility model applications, incorporating examinations for manifest novelty and practicality defects31—thereby enhancing the authorization quality of utility models. Intrinsically, such amendments represent pivotal CUMP-related institutional overhauls, with more detailed operational norms specifically designed to effectively implement and supplement these overhauls disseminated across numerous multi-level patent-related regulatory documents.32
2. Multi-level patent-related regulatory documents
In response to the widely acknowledged low quality33 of a substantial number of granted CUMPs, regulatory authorities such as the China National Intellectual Property Administration (“CNIPA”)34 have formulated a series of regulatory rules governing patent applications across all types. These rules aim to curtail and gradually eliminate low-quality patents at the most upstream stage of the patent lifecycle, as opposed to invalidating them through downstream mechanisms—such as judicial reviews—that entail high transaction costs.
In this context, SIPO first promulgated a specific administrative regulation in 2007—Several Provisions of the State Intellectual Property Office on Regulating Patent Application Activities35—aimed at curbing abnormal patent filing behaviors.36 Prior to the 2013 administrative reform,37China’s utility model preliminary examination system prohibited the use of search procedures, which inherently rendered the “examination for obvious substantive defects” ineffective in practice.38
Subsequently, SIPO promulgated a revised version of the regulation through the Decision of the State Intellectual Property Office on Amending the Several Provisions on Regulating Patent Application Activities (2017),39with amended Article 340 at its core, which aimed to broaden its scope of application. Notwithstanding these revisions, abnormal patent filing practices remained insufficiently curbed and were far from eradicated—factors that prompted CNIPA to issue the Notice of the China National Intellectual Property Administration on Further Strictly Regulating Patent Application Activities41 in 2021.
This initiative aimed to strictly implement high-quality development requirements, further regulate patent filing activities, and enhance patent application quality.42 In close succession, CNIPA formalized the measures outlined in the Notice by promulgating the Measures for Regulating Patent Application Activities43 in March 2021, thereby institutionalizing these regulatory initiatives.
II. A Landmark Revision to Raise the Inventiveness Threshold of CUMPs44
A. Principal Deficiencies of the Historical CUMP Legal System
Undeniably, China’s current UMP legal system demonstrates both notable merits and inherent limitations. In analyzing the well-documented deficiencies of China’s historical UMP legal system, a bifurcated analytical framework can be adopted. On the one hand, certain deficiencies are inherent to utility model systems globally—recognized internationally long before China’s UMP system was established—principally manifested as quantitative proliferation coupled with qualitative inadequacy. On the other hand, some CUMP-specific institutional flaws exhibit distinct indigenous characteristics. Notwithstanding this categorization, these two types of deficiencies are often inextricably intertwined in practice.
1. Intrinsic Deficiencies Specific to UMPs
Controversies surrounding China’s utility model patents are attributable, in part, to the long-debated unchecked proliferation of “junk patents”45—or, at the very least, “questionable patents.”46 The definition of “questionable patents” remains a matter of scholarly debate.47 Notably, Tian Lipu, former Director of CNIPA, has underscored a fundamental distinction between “questionable patents” and “junk patents”: the former denote patents whose protection scope is overly broad or which violate the Patent Law’s provisions even after grant, while the latter refer to inventions entirely lacking innovative substance.48 These so-called “junk patents” are predominantly concentrated in two domains: utility models and design patents.49
These “abnormal” patents have prompted serious domestic and international concerns. Approximately a decade ago, numerous observers of China’s patent system drew a direct equivalence between “junk patents” and utility model patents50—a perspective that mirrored prevailing public perceptions regarding the frequently reported “low-quality” profile of utility models.51 Yet the distinction between patents claiming technical improvements of minimal significance and those devoid of innovative substance remains tenuous. Thus, to a certain extent, the issuance of low-quality utility model patents may be inherent in the historical design of China’s utility model legal system.
2. Historical Trends in CUMP Applications and Underlying Causal Factors
To identify a representative historical benchmark year for analyzing UMP filing trends, 2021 serves as an appropriate case. According to WIPO statistics, China received 1.59 million patent applications in 2021—exceeding that of the United States by over 100%.52 Whereas with respect to UMPs, an overwhelming majority of global applications originate from Chinese applicants.53 WIPO data further shows that China recorded 2,852,219 UMP applications in 2021, with 99.76% filed by domestic applicants (amounting to 2,845,318 domestic applications).54 Meanwhile, although the working rate of Chinese UMPs—tracked by CNIPA—has exhibited a steady upward trend over the past five years, approximately 40% of granted UMPs remain unutilized in practice.55
Commentators have posited that the primary driver behind these filing trends—particularly over the past decade—lies, at least partially, in domestic industrial policies incorporating patent-related subsidies and tax incentives, which effectively incentivized patent filings.56 While initially formulated to foster domestic innovation, these policies were exploited by numerous domestic enterprises adopting a “quantity-driven innovation” strategy, prioritizing maximal patent filings over the substantive quality of the underlying inventions.57
In recent years, China has increasingly acknowledged the adverse impacts of formulating and implementing policies intertwined with patent subsidies and tax incentives. As a result, a series of corrective measures have been instituted. For example, CNIPA issued the Notice on Continuously Strengthening the Regulation of Patent Application Conduct, which aims to progressively reduce financial subsidies for patent authorizations by at least twenty-five percentage points annually—with the goal of phasing out such support entirely by 2025.58
B. The Selected Approach to an Inventiveness-Oriented Screening Mechanism
Once granted, utility model patents may thus function as an oppressive instrument enabling large enterprises to suppress smaller competitors—given that invalidation proceedings and litigation could impose prohibitive financial burdens on small firms, which were often unable to withstand aggressive patent assertions. In its formal response to abolitionist arguments advocating the dismantling of the CUMP legal regime, the CNIPA explicitly emphasized both the historical and contemporary significance of the system, alongside the imperative of its further reform—rather than pursuing its outright elimination from China’s intellectual property ecosystem.59 Consequently, subsequent official initiatives have centered on refining the statutory framework and its enforcement mechanisms.60 As outlined in Part II, a succession of institutional refinements targeting the CUMP legal regime have been operationalized over the past decades. Yet the volume of granted UMPs of inferior quality has not exhibited a substantive reduction—particularly prior to the 2021 draft enactment of unprecedented inventiveness-oriented quality-enhancing measures, designed to directly curtail the future emergence of low-quality UMPs.61
In fact, the proposition of introducing a substantive examination mechanism to assess the inventiveness of utility model patents is not a novel one. Such arguments have long been advocated by academic circles and even senior government officials.62 As of the present writing, two salient national initiatives centered on CUMPs have been propelled forward, with the objective of upgrading the quality of innovation inherent in such patents.
To begin with, in 2021, the CNIPA issued a Notice on Soliciting Public Comments on the Draft Revision of the Guidelines for Patent Examination (Draft for Comment),63 which addressed the inventiveness threshold applicable to the preliminary examination of utility model patent applications. The relevant clause in the Notice states: “In accordance with the prior art information at the examiner’s disposal, the latter may conduct an examination to ascertain whether a utility model patent application is manifestly deficient in inventiveness.”64
Evidently, the integration of the new criterion of “manifestly deficient in inventiveness” into the Guidelines for Patent Examination is designed to directly and effectively curtail the issuance of low-quality Chinese utility model patents.65 As of the present date, the Implementation Rules of the Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China,66which formally entered into force on January 20, 2024, have explicitly integrated provisions within Article 50 pertaining to the examination of whether UMP applications are manifestly deficient in inventiveness.67 This regulatory adjustment serves to further enhance the quality of UMPs at the source, thereby fortifying the bidirectional transmission function of UMP examination—namely, promoting the advancement of scientific and technological innovation capabilities upstream and facilitating the realization of UMP-based market value downstream.
The second initiative pertains to the Promotion Plan for In-depth Implementation of the Opinions on Strengthening the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights (hereinafter referred to as the “Promotion Plan”).68 This recently formulated comprehensive national-level administrative initiative is designed to effectively advance the recent top-tier intellectual property strategy jointly promulgated by the General Office of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council.69 The Promotion Plan encompasses a broad spectrum of intellectual property-related matters, including 114 nationally prioritized items, among which one pertains to utility model patents. Clause 26 of the Promotion Plan stipulates: “To advance the reform of the utility model patent system and introduce a screening mechanism for examining utility model patent applications that are manifestly deficient in inventiveness[] ([t]o be accomplished by the end of December 2025).”70
This statement reaffirms the Chinese government’s commitment to curbing the proliferation of low-quality UMPs. A key consideration in the implementation of this reform thus lies in determining an appropriate nonobviousness threshold for screening purposes. To elaborate, in operational terms, patent examiners are required to reject UMP applications that are manifestly obvious and deficient in sufficient inventiveness; conversely, they must also exercise prudence to avoid setting an unduly stringent inventiveness threshold, as such stringency could blur the demarcation between invention patents and UMPs, thereby undermining the very raison d’être of the CUMP legal regime. Attaining such a socially optimal inventiveness threshold will likely necessitate a continuous process of calibration. Hence the practical efficacy of the aforementioned reforms will remain under scrutiny in the years ahead.
While it is imprudent to presume to anticipate all future institutional reforms pertaining to China’s utility model patent system, there is little doubt that China will render this legal regime more adaptive to its innovation-driven development landscape amid mounting pressures—all in pursuit of the overarching strategic goal articulated in An Outline for Building a Powerful Intellectual Property Nation (2021–2035). Specifically, institutional refinements to China’s utility model patent system can be construed as a mechanism for “attaining a high level of scientific and technological self-reliance and emerging among the world’s forefront innovative nations.” 71
Ⅲ. Transnational Ramifications of Elevating the Inventiveness Threshold for CUMPs
As China’s top leadership has iterated consistently over the past decade, “[c]hina’s door to opening up will never be closed; it will only open wider.”72 Looking ahead, as China’s opening-up advances to an increasingly sophisticated level, its engagements with a multitude of foreign nations and regions across economic, trade, and other domains will grow progressively more intertwined. In turn, the formulation and enforcement of China’s domestic laws with foreign-related dimensions will exert an external influence of broader breadth and deeper intensity—encompassing, as a natural corollary, the transnational ramifications of China’s UMP legal regime. Salient existing and potential transnational ramifications are probed in sequence below.
A. Observed and Potential Transnational Ramifications Within Domestic Jurisdictions
Concomitant with the formal institutional entrenchment of elevating the inventiveness threshold for CUMPs, there has emerged a statistically observable downward trend in granted UMPs within China.73 Simultaneously, a constellation of transnational ramifications has progressively unfolded both domestically and externally. With respect to the former, three categories of ramifications bearing transnational dimensions are of particular note.
Firstly, as the volume of granted substandard UMPs with deficient inventiveness has declined substantially, the likelihood of the anti-commons tragedy is concomitantly diminished. Stated differently, domestic and foreign enterprises engaged in legitimate commercial operations within China are confronted with fewer potential litigations stemming from infringing UMPs that have traditionally been challenging to invalidate.
Secondly, against the backdrop of the recently elevated inventiveness threshold, domestic and foreign enterprises engaged in legitimate commercial operations within China are afforded an enhanced likelihood of successfully invalidating such misgranted substandard UMPs that lack the requisite inventiveness, thereby redressing market distortions and protecting their legitimate market interests. A recent illustrative example is the invalidation request case concerning the UMP for “a composite decorative panel,” which ranks among the top ten reexamination and invalidation cases of the CNIPA.74 Following adjudication, the Patent Reexamination and Invalidation Department of the CNIPA Patent Office issued Decision No. 563521 on the Examination of UMP Invalidation Request, declaring the UMP entirely invalid.75
Thirdly, over the past decade, a growing number of foreign enterprises have entered China and filed applications for UMPs.76 Subsequent to the formal institutional entrenchment of elevating the inventiveness threshold for CUMPs, the right stability of future CUMPs—including those filed by foreign enterprises—is anticipated to be further enhanced.77 Correspondingly, the strengthened right stability of CUMPs will, to a certain extent, foster a more stable and secure business environment for foreign CUMP holders engaged in commercial activities within China.
B. Potential Transnational Ramifications Beyond National Borders
The marked upgrading of the inventiveness threshold within the examination criteria of China’s utility model patent legal system may also entail extraterritorial ramifications.
To start with, this substantial elevation impels Chinese enterprises to attach greater importance to enhancing the inventiveness of technical solutions embedded in their UMP applications in China. More importantly, the improved inventiveness of such solutions substantially augments the likelihood that these enterprises will secure authorization when filing UMP applications via PCT international applications78 in jurisdictions with a UMP legal system, while concurrently bolstering the stability of their holdings of such authorized UMPs. In consequence, this enhances Chinese enterprises’ ability to conduct legitimate overseas commercial activities with heightened confidence and efficiency, predicated on their authorized UMPs.
In addition, given that China has successively integrated utility model-related provisions into the intellectual property clauses of several FTAs,79 this substantial upgrading of the inventiveness threshold in China’s utility model examination regime may thus induce commensurate adjustments in China’s strategies for international coordination on utility model patent filing and examination during subsequent FTA negotiations. This, in turn, is likely to engender certain cross-border institutional spillover effects within the jurisdictions of the respective FTA signatories. In furtherance thereof, from the vantage point of operationalizing the strategy for developing a robust IP-based nation, the negotiation and drafting of IP provisions—including those pertaining to UMPs—in subsequent bilateral or regional FTAs may undoubtedly be construed as the tangible operationalization of the strategic initiatives enunciated in China’s Outline for Building a Robust IP-based Nation (2021-2035).80 As embedded within the nation’s top-tier institutional framework, this outline emphasizes the strategic imperative of “actively participating in the reform and development of the global IP governance system.”81
Conclusion
Concurrent with the formal institutional entrenchment of raising the inventiveness threshold for CUMPs, a statistically discernible downward trajectory in the number of granted UMPs in China has emerged. Going forward, in the further implementation of the vital examination criterion for utility model patents—namely, “manifestly deficient in inventiveness,” which was formally integrated into China’s patent legal framework in 2024—China may also draw upon innovative methodologies employed in U.S. patent examination that are conducive to enhancing the efficiency and accuracy of the examination process.82 Such methodologies include, for instance, the utilization of state-of-the-art AI-assisted prior art searches83 to augment the efficacy and precision of examinations.
Meanwhile, as China’s opening-up initiatives progress toward greater sophistication, its interactions with numerous foreign nations and regions in economic, trade, and other spheres will become increasingly intertwined. Concomitantly, the formulation and enforcement of China’s domestic laws with foreign-related elements will exert an external influence of greater breadth and depth—encompassing, as a logical corollary, the transnational ramifications of China’s UMP legal regime.
Regarding the observed and potential transnational ramifications within China’s territorial scope, on the one hand, the progressive reduction of low-quality UMPs lacking sufficient inventiveness objectively mitigates the risk of infringement litigation faced by multinational corporations operating in China. On the other hand, as the volume of utility model patent applications filed by foreign enterprises in China increases incrementally, the elevated inventiveness-based examination criteria enable foreign enterprises to engage in legitimate commercial activities with greater confidence following the grant of their UMPs—a confidence underpinned by their possession of UMPs exhibiting greater stability. In essence, from any perspective, this institutional optimization serves to foster a more predictable, equitable, and well-ordered legal environment for foreign enterprises operating commercially in China.
In relation to the potential transnational ramifications beyond China’s borders, this elevation in the inventiveness threshold compels Chinese enterprises to prioritize enhancing the inventiveness of technical solutions embedded in their domestic UMP applications. Also, the improved inventiveness of such solutions may increase the likelihood that these enterprises will obtain authorization when filing UMP applications through PCT international filings in jurisdictions with a UMP regime, while concomitantly enhancing the stability of their authorized UMP holdings. Consequently, this strengthens Chinese enterprises’ capacity to engage in legitimate overseas commercial operations with greater confidence and efficiency, grounded in their authorized UMPs. Moreover, given that China has successively integrated UMP-centered provisions into the IP clauses of some FTAs, such upgrading of the inventiveness threshold within China’s UMP examination regime may induce corresponding adjustments in China’s strategies for international coordination regarding UMP filing and examination during subsequent FTA negotiations. This, in turn, is likely to generate specific transnational institutional spillover effects within the jurisdictions of respective FTA signatories, thereby enhancing, to a certain extent, the effectiveness and efficiency of the regional IP institutional framework.
* Yang Yu, Associate Professor, School of Global Governance, Shanghai University of International Busi-ness and Economics. Ph.D. in Law (Fudan University); European Master in Law and Economics (Erasmus Mundus Scholarship). The author has independently and collaboratively published a number of English articles in international journals, etc., such as British Medical Journal Global Health (SSCI/SCI Q1), Ameri-can University Law Review, Queen Mary Journal of Intellectual Property (SSCI), Journal of East Asia and International Law (ESCI), China and WTO Review (ESCI), Journal of Intellectual Property Rights, IEEE Communications Standards Magazine, PATENTLYO, etc.
1. See WIPO, IP Facts and Figures 2024 10 (2023), https://www.wipo.int/web-publications/ip-facts-and-figures-2024/en/index.html [https://perma.cc/7A7Z-PZZA].
2. See Graham Dutfield & Uma Suthersanen, Global Intellectual Property Law 178 (2008).
3. See Roland Liesegang, German Utility Models After the 1990 Reform Act, 20 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 4–5 (1992).
4. See Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, Yifan Mao & Tiffany Thomas, Utility Models: Economical, Efficient, and Enforceable Patent Protection, JD Supra (June 23, 2022), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/utility-models-economical-efficient-and-4367830/#:~:text=However%2C%20utility%20models%20are%20widely,be%20taken%20as%20legal%20advice [https://perma.cc/8GKY-SDVE].
5. See H. Naumann, Utility Model Patent Protection, 40 J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 800, 803 (1958).
6. The institutional rationale has long been explored. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1610–13 (1982).
7. In the specific context of this article, China refers to the mainland of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter “PRC”).
8. China led the world in both patent and UMP applications in 2024, see WIPO, supra note 1; see also WIPO, World Intellectual Property Indicators 2024 27, 53, https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo-pub-941-2024-en-world-intellectual-property-indicators-2024.pdf [https://perma.cc/GSN3-7RW2].
9. For instance, China has yet to attain the global top tier in terms of innovation capability. See WIPO, Global Innovation Index 2022: What Is the Future of Innovation-Driven Growth? 22 (2022) (“China moves up to 11th place.”). In the latest edition of this annual index, China remains at eleventh place. See WIPO, Global Innovation Index 2024: Unlocking the Promise of Social Entrepreneurship 19 (2024), https://www.wipo.int/web-publications/global-innovation-index-2024/en/ [https://perma.cc/MZA3-L67C].
10. To some extent, these low-quality granted patents in China may be equivalent to the “questionable patents” with poor quality referred to in an official report released by the Federal Trade Commission of the U.S.A two decades ago. See Fed. Trade Comm’n, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy (2003), https://www.ftc.gov/reports/promote-innovation-proper-balance-competition-patent-law-policy [https://perma.cc/WE4P-CK5Q]. See also FTC, To Promote Innovation: The Power Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy, 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 861 (2004).
11. This phenomenon has long been observed and explored. See, e.g., Dan Prud’homme, China’s Shifting Patent Landscape and State-Led Patenting Strategy, 10(8) J. Intell. Prop. L. & Prac. 619–625 (2015).
12. See 中华人民共和国专利法 [Patent Law of The People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., effective Mar. 12, 1984) 1984 Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. (China). In addition, a series of translated multi-tiered CUMP-related legal documents are available on the WIPO’s website, see Laws Collection Search Results: Utility Models, WIPO, https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/legislation/results?countryOrgs=CN&subjectMatter=2&last=true (last visited Apr. 11, 2026) [https://perma.cc/R7S4-FLFV].
13. Nigel Lee, 4th Amendment to the Chinese Implementing Regulations of the Patent Law: Implications for Foreign Applicants, D Young & Co Knowledge Bank (Feb. 13, 2024), https://www.dyoung.com/en/knowledgebank/articles/4th-amendment-chinese-implementing-regulations [https://perma.cc/4PSW-UL5W ].
14. Charles W. Gray, China’s Revised Patent Guidelines & Drafting Strategy, Kilpatrick (Dec. 29, 2025), https://ktslaw.com/en/insights/alert/2025/12/chinas%20revised%20patent%20guidelines%20and%20drafting%20strategy [https://perma.cc/Q2YR-XLRF].
15. See, e.g., Xiaoqing Feng, The Interaction Between Enhancing the Capacity for Independent Innovation and Patent Protection: A Perspective on the Third Amendment to the Patent Law of the P.R. China, 9 Pitt. J. Tech. L. & Pol’y 1, 54 (2009). The historical imperative of enhancing patent quality is not exclusive to China. Indeed, the effective enhancement of patent quality has long constituted one of the pivotal challenges confronting U.S. patent law. See Sean B. Seymore, Patent Asymmetries, 49 U.C.D. L. Rev. 963, 976 (2016).
16. See Sam F. Halabi, Intellectual Property and The New International Economic Order: Oligopoly, Regulation, And Wealth Redistribution in The Global Knowledge Economy 11 (2018).
17. See Chris Devonshire-Ellis, Andy Scott & Sam Woollard, Intellectual Property Rights in China 7 (2d ed., Springer 2011).
18. See Peter Ganea & JIN Haijun, China, in Intellectual Property in Asia Law, Economics, History and Politics 20 (Springer 2009).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., Teresa J. Welch, Patent Law and Practice in the People’s Republic of China: Patenting of T.A. Widgets by a United States Enterprise, 5 Wis. Int’l L.J. 130, 133 (1986). See also Yieyie Yang, Reforming the Utility Model System in China: Time to Limit Utility Model Patents’ Scope of Protection and Improve the Quality of Chinese Utility Model Patents, 42 AIPLA Q. J. 393, 406–12 (2014).
22. See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, Second Tier Patent Protection, 40 Harv. Int’l. L. J. 151, 219 (1999). In broader theoretical contexts, such second-tier patents have been conceptualized as deviant protective regimes, standing in contrast to “orthodox” intellectual property institutions. See J. H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2432, 2454 (1994).
23. See Urvi Shrivastava & Abhinav Pradhan, Utility Model Regime as a Tool to Protect Green Innovation: A comparative Study of India, China, and Germany, 7 ShodhKosh: Journal of Visual and Performing Arts 514, 518 (2026).
24. See Sean A. Pager, Patents on a Shoestring: Making Patent Protection Work for Developing Countries, 23 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 755, 803 (2007).
25. See Michael Andreas Kock, Intellectual Property Protection for Plant Related Innovation Fit for Future? 196 (2022).
26. Yingying Shen, Chinese Utility Model Patents: An Underestimated Protection Weapon for IP, Asia IP (Aug. 15, 2025), https://asiaiplaw.com/article/chinese-utility-model-patents-an-underestimated-protection-weapon-for-ip#:~:text=Fast%20grant.,invention%20patents%20to%20be%20granted [https://perma.cc/3X9B-NCXN].
27. See Jeremy Phillips, A Spanner in the Works–Or the Spanner that Works? Patents and the Intellectual Property System, in Patent Law and Theory a Handbook of Contemporary Research 147 (2008).
28. State Intellectual Property Office of the P.R. China, Development of China’s Utility Model Patent System, China Nat’l Intell. Prop. Admin., https://english.cnipa.gov.cn/art/2013/1/5/art_1340_81044.html (last updated Jan. 5, 2013) [https://perma.cc/V4FH-5YHY].
29. See 中华人民共和国专利法 [Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, amended Dec. 27, 2008, effective Oct. 1, 2009) arts. 9, 22.
30. State Intellectual Property Office of the P.R. China, supra note 28.
31. See Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (2010 Revision), art. 44.
32. On the Amendments to the Implementing Regulations of the Patent Law, China.org.cn (Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.china.org.cn/node_7064105/content_19362278.htm [https://perma.cc/DNW9-9PVX].
33. In essence, the intractable issue of the proliferation of low-quality patents is not exclusive to China. Even in the United States—widely regarded as one of the most technologically advanced nations—concerns have long been voiced regarding the systemic problem of the excessive issuance of low-quality patents. See, e.g., Sean B. Seymore, Patenting New Uses for Old Inventions, 73 Vand. L. Rev. 479, 526 (2020).
34. This new English name was adopted on August 28, 2018. See Notice on the Official Launch of the New English Translated Name of the National Intellectual Property Administration, Aug. 28, 2018, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2018-12/31/content_5443904.htm [https://perma.cc/9UBY-8FJJ]. For the sake of terminological precision, this Article employs the updated English name for all events and official documents issued subsequent to the Notice, while retaining the former designation—State Intellectual Property Office (hereafter “SIPO”)—for historical references.
35. See 关于规范专利申请行为的若干规定 [Several Provisions of the SIPO on Regulating Patent Application Activities] (promulgated by the State Intell. Prop. Office, Order No. 45, effective Oct. 1, 2007).
36. See id. at art. 3.
37. See 国家知识产权局关于修改《专利审查指南》的决定 [Decision of the State Intellectual Property Office on Amending the Guidelines for Patent Examination] (promulgated by SIPO, Order No. 67, issued Sep. 16, 2013, effective Oct. 15, 2013), part Ⅰ.
38. See Chinese Patent Office Tightens Examination on Utility Model Patents, Union Patent Service Centre (May 2015), https://www.unionpatent.com.hk/en/Newsletter/Trademark-License-System-and-Practice#:~:text=2.,in%20Accordance%20with%20Article%2022.2 [https://perma.cc/59JL-6VJU].
39. See 关于规范专利申请行为的若干规定 [Several Provisions Regarding the Regulation of Patent Application Conduct] (promulgated by SIPO, Order No. 75, effective Apr. 1, 2017).
40. See id. (amending art. 3).
41. See 国家知识产权局关于持续严格规范专利申请行为的通知 [Notice of the China National Intellectual Property Administration on Further Strictly Regulating Patent Application Activities] (promulgated by the China Nat]l Intell. Prop. Admin., No. 1, effective Jan. 27, 2021).
42. Justin Davidson & Stanley Ng, Combating the Unsustainable Rise of Patent Application Numbers in the PRC (Feb. 22, 2021), https://www.thebrandprotectionblog.com/2021/02/combating-the-unsustainable-rise-of-patent-application-numbers-in-the-prc/#:~:text=The%20Brand%20Protection%20Blog,-Covering%20the%20legal&text=Coincidently%2C%20or%20perhaps%20not%20coincidentally,any%20legal%20or%20technical%20necessity [https://perma.cc/F3C2-254R].
43. See 关于规范申请专利行为的办法 [Announcement on the Measures for Regulating Patent Application Activities] (promulgated by the China Nat. Intell. Prop. Admin., Annoucement No. 411, effective Mar. 11, 2021).
44. To some extent, this initiative to enhance inventiveness bears striking resemblance to a similar measure proposed in the United States two decades ago. See Fed. Trade Comm’n, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition and Patent Law and Policy, supra note 10, at 10 (“Recommendation 3: Tighten Certain Legal Standards Used to Evaluate Whether a Patent Is ‘Obvious.’”).
45. Observers argued that “patent subsidies incentivize applicants to file opportunistic applications for inventions of low patentability or low value that would have not been filed without those subsides. Thus, they claim that most filings in this China patent boom are so-called ‘junk inventions.’” See Zhen Lei, Zhen Sun & Brian Wright, Patent Subsidy and Patent Filing in China 2 (2013), https://funginstitute.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/patent_subsidy_Zhen.pdf [https://perma.cc/VNY5-YKUQ].
46. Vishal, From Subsidies to Supremacy: How China Turned Bulk Filings and Junk Patents into Innovation Power, Copperpod (Nov. 11, 2025), https://www.copperpodip.com/post/from-subsidies-to-supremacy-how-china-turned-bulk-filings-and-junk-patents-into-innovation-power [https://perma.cc/D48B-L6QJ].
47. Patrick A. Doody, What Is A Bad Patent?, IPAdovcate.org (June 18, 2010), http://ipadvocatefoundation.org/What-is-a-Bad-Patent_T204.cfm [https://perma.cc/ZJR9-FEZK].
48. Yu Yang, China’s Utility Model Patent Legal System in Sub-Patent Innovation Rights 200, 211 (Cambridge Univ. Press ed. 2025)
49. See “Questionable Patent” Does Not Equal “Junk Patent”, Legal Daily, Dec. 28, 2005, at 1.
50. See, e.g., Dan Prud’homme, Dulling the Cutting Edge: How Patent-Related Policies and Practices Hamper Innovation in China, 1 European Chamber of Commerce in China Publications 1, 22 (2012), https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/43299/1/MPRA_paper_43299.pdf [https://perma.cc/SW7D-TBF7]. See also Thomas T. Moga, China’s Utility Model Patent System: Innovation Driver or Deterrent, Report for the U.S. Chamber Of Commerce 8 (Nov. 2012). In contrast, other sharply opposite views regard China’s utility model patents as treasure rather than trash. See, e.g., Binqiang Lui, China Utility Model Patent: Trash or Treasure – A Data-Based Analysis, 54 IDEA 225, 253 (2014).
51. See Vishal, supra note 46.
52. See WIPO, World Intellectual Property Indicators 2022 9, https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo-pub-941-2022-en-world-intellectual-property-indicators-2022.pdf [https://perma.cc/N24Y-RLCX].
53. See Yu Feifeng, Drawbacks of Patent Law and Counter Measures, J. of Nanjing U. Sci. & Tech. 51–58 (2017).
54. For a statistical table of three kinds of patent applications at home and abroad, see Guide to Inquiry of Publicly Disclosed IPRs Statistics, China Nat. Intell. Prop. Admin. (2022 edition), https://www.cnipa.gov.cn/art/2022/7/28/art_88_172404.html [https://perma.cc/Z6HY-NVZY].
55. See 2021 China Patent Survey Report 33 https://www.cnipa-ipdrc.org.cn/news_content.aspx?newsId=289 [https://perma.cc/L463-WTD9].
56. Webin Rao, Yong Wang & Tian-ying Zhao, Why the Chinese Government Is Reducing Domestic Patent Filing Subsidies and How Rights Holders Can Adapt, AIM (Sep. 2025), https://www.iam-media.com/guide/china-managing-the-ip-lifecycle/2026/article/why-the-chinese-government-reducing-domestic-patent-filing-subsidies-and-how-rights-holders-can-adapt#:~:text=For%20many%20years%2C%20the%20Chinese,to%20this%20changing%20policy%20environment [https://perma.cc/D65V-37U6].
57. See Li Wenjing & Zheng Manni, Substantive Innovation or Strategic Innovation? The Impact of Macro-Industrial Policy on Micro-Enterprise Innovation, Econ. Rsch. J. 60–73 (2016) .
58. See China National Intellectual Property Administration: All Kinds of Financial Support for Patent Grants Will Be Canceled by 2025, Xinhua News Agency (Jan. 27, 2022), http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2022-01/27/content_5670755.htm [https://perma.cc/PGX8-BWN3].
59. See infra text and accompanying note 64.
60. The CNIPA issued an official response to a netizen’s comment concerning the proposition of abolishing China’s utility model patent system. See Abolish the Utility Model Patent System? CNIPA Responds!, IPR Daily (May 26, 2021, at 19:06 CT), http://www.iprdaily.cn/news_29223.html.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Chen Yong (Grade Ⅲ Examiner, Director of Machinery Division, Utility Model Examination Department, CNIPA), On the Examination of Inventiveness for UMPs, [J]. Intell. Prop. 73–76 (2013).
63. See CNIPA, 关于就《专利审查指南修改草案（征求意见稿）》公开征求意见的通知 [Notice on Soliciting Public Opinions on the Draft Revision of the Guidelines for Patent Examination (Draft for Comment]), Aug. 3, 2021, https://www.cnipa.gov.cn/art/2021/8/3/art_75_166474.html [https://perma.cc/48U5-56X8]. In addition, on October 31, 2022, the CNIPA issued 关于就《专利审查指南修改草案（再次征求意见稿）》公开征求意见的通知 [Notice on Soliciting Public Opinions on the Draft Revision of the Guidelines for Patent Examination (Draft Again for Comment)], http://www.cnipa.gov.cn/art/2022/10/31/art_75_180016.html [https://perma.cc/LG6G-LX48].
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See 国务院关于修改《中华人民共和国专利法实施细则》的决定 [Decision of the State Council on Amending the Implementation Rules of the Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Decree No. 306, issued Dec. 21, 2023, effective Jan. 20, 2024), https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/202312/content_6921633.htm [https://perma.cc/3U6F-AHWL].
67. Id. at ¶ 19.
68. See 深入实施《关于强化知识产权保护的意见》推进计划 [Promotion Plan for In-depth Implementation of the Opinions on Strengthening the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights] (promulgated by CNIPA, effective Oct. 28, 2022), https://www.cnipa.gov.cn/art/2022/10/28/art_545_179970.html [https://perma.cc/XX5M-CH4F].
69. See 中共中央办公厅 国务院办公厅印发《关于强化知识产权保护的意见》[Opinions on Strengthening the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights], (promulgated by the General Office of the CPC Central Committee & the State Council, effective Nov. 24, 2019), http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2019-11/24/content_5455070.htm [https://perma.cc/4QYT-BC82].
70. Promotion Plan for In-depth Implementation of the Opinions on Strengthening the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 68, at ¶ 26 (Yang Yu, trans.).
71. See Xi Jinping, The Report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Oct. 25, 2022), http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2022-10/25/content_5721685.htm [https://perma.cc/3A3E-T75B ](Yang Yu, trans.).
72. See Xi Jinping, Unswervingly Advancing High-Level Opening-Up, Qiushi (July 15, 2025), http://www.qstheory.cn/20250714/4506ed33ca0a495da1fd0243ff66cc77/c.html [https://perma.cc/N7QH-DS42].
73. For instance, the total number of granted UMPs from January to June 2025 stood at 756,682, whereas the corresponding figure for January to June 2024 was 966,514. This represents a year-on-year decrease of 209,832 granted UMPs, equivalent to a decline of 21.71%. See Monthly Report on Examination, Registration and Filing by the National Intellectual Property Administration, https://www.cnipa.gov.cn/col/col61/index.html [https://perma.cc/EP2X-JMJ5].
74. See [Top Ten Cases] Invalidation Request Case Regarding the UMP for “A Composite Decorative Panel”, CNIPA (July 8, 2024), https://www.cnipa.gov.cn/art/2024/7/8/art_2648_193635.html [https://perma.cc/J8NS-73PX].
75. Id. In addition, there are other widely known, high-level recent similar cases. For instance, see Zhang Zhaohui, After a Decade-Long Entanglement with Coman Medical, One of Mindray Medical’s Patents Has Been Ruled Entirely Invalid, BJNEWS (Sep. 10, 2024), https://www.bjnews.com.cn/detail/1725959155168875.html [https://perma.cc/3L4F-TWV2].
76. See, e.g., Patents Filed by 115 Belt and Road Co-Building Countries in China Have Exceeded 250,000, China Science Daily (Oct. 19, 2023), https://www.ncsti.gov.cn/kjdt/xwjj/202310/t20231019_139071.html [https://perma.cc/TS73-5D47]; see also CNIPA, supra note 28.
77. Rieko Michishita, Utility Model Patents in China, Bird & Bird (Sep. 14, 2021), https://www.twobirds.com/en/insights/2021/china/utility-model-patents-in-china#:~:text=2.,both%20invention%20and%20utility%20model [https://perma.cc/ST9Z-PE2C].
78. See CNIPA: In 2024, China’s Overseas Intellectual Property Filings Exhibited Increased Vitality, China Daily (Jan. 15, 2025), https://cn.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202501/15/WS67873852a310b59111dadd15.html [https://perma.cc/CE87-XKWX].
79. See, e.g., General Administration of Customs Announcement No. 63 of 2015 (Announcement on Matters Relating to the Implementation of the Free Trade Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Korea), [Date of Issuance] Dec. 20, 2015, http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/zgdwjjmywg/art/2016/art_58328e5f77f44770829d02ab6144e72d.html; Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Korea, China-S. Kor., June 1, 2015, 55 I.L.M. 531, available at https://edit.wti.org/document/show/a591392b-4607-4f04-9737-ab79380a226f [https://perma.cc/L22F-Y76P].
80. See Outline for Building a Robust IP-based Nation (2021-2035), 2021 Gazette of State Council 29 (Sep. 22, 2021), https://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2021/content_5643253.htm [https://perma.cc/4N4Z-ZCSN].
81. See id. (“Actively participate in the reform and development of the global intellectual property (IP) governance system. Expand opening-up in the IP field, improve mechanisms for international dialogue and exchanges, and promote the refinement of international rules and standards pertaining to IP as well as related international trade and international investment. Actively advance multilateral and bilateral foreign negotiations on IP matters related to economic and trade . . . .”).
82. See infra text and accompanying note 83.
83. See Vaishali Udupa & Devon Kramer, The Integration of Al and Patents, 104 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y [i], 4 (2024).
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