THE SUB ROSA SUBCHAPTER: INDIVIDUAL DEBTORS IN CHAPTER 11 AFTER BAPCPA

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Reorganization under the Bankruptcy Code serves the public interest by providing worthy debtors a mechanism to gain relief from crushing debt while maintaining some measure of fidelity to creditors. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) of 2005 initiated fundamental changes to this mechanism in an effort to ensure the continued worthiness of bankruptcy applicants.

BAPCPA changes a number of provisions in the Code with respect to individual debtors. This article suggests that BAPCPA’s provisions have created and will continue to create unexpected anomalies in individual chapter 11 cases, due in large part to the manner in which BAPCPA provisions affecting such individuals are scattered throughout the Code. The author contends that BAPCPA’s reworking of chapter 11 created a hidden category of individual reorganization. As Congress was building this mystery, it unnecessarily masked the import of substantive changes to chapter 11. Attempting to shed light on the matter, the author explores the roots of the BAPCPA provisions and summarizes the five most significant adjustments relevant to individual debtors in chapter 11, contrasting chapter 11’s operation with that of chapter 13.

Chapter 11 for individuals post-BAPCPA tends to work mischief at all stages in the reorganization process. New concerns arise with regard to the debtor’s ability to pay expenses necessary to achieve confirmation of the reorganization plan. Uncertainties exist regarding the allocation of property into the estate, and as to who may have standing in postconfirmation plan modifications. As the article suggests, Congress could have avoided, or even discovered, many of these difficulties if BAPCPA’s provisions had been grouped together as a separate subchapter to chapter 11.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Individuals\(^1\) and chapter 11\(^2\) have a rocky history. It took a Supreme Court decision to confirm that individuals were eligible debtors under chapter 11.\(^3\) Even when individuals were allowed to file, fights broke out over what property was theirs\(^4\) and whether they could ever use the new value corollary to the absolute priority rule.\(^5\)

This chafing is more than a mere annoyance. The number of individual chapter 11 cases is not small. Indeed, it far exceeds chapter 11 cases in which the debtor is a public company. By some counts, individual chapter 11 cases account for between 10 to 15%\(^6\) and perhaps as much as 36%\(^7\) of all chapter 11 bankruptcy cases. This means that in fiscal year 2005, which saw an all-time low of some 6800 chapter 11 filings,\(^8\) at least 680 individuals, and maybe as many as 2448 individuals, filed

\(^1\) The term “individual” is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, or for that matter, in the Uniform Commercial Code, even though both codes use the term extensively. When used in this article, I mean a flesh-and-blood, living human being, not some artificial juridical entity.


\(^4\) Compare In re Herberman, 122 B.R. 273 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990), with In re FitzSimmons, 725 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1984).

\(^5\) Compare In re Gosman, 282 B.R. 45 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2002) (holding that one may not use homestead as “new value” contribution; exempt property must be devoted to creditors’ claims in chapter 11 plan), with In re Henderson, 321 B.R. 550, 558–66 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005) (holding that one may use exempt homestead as “new value” contribution), and In re Henke, 90 B.R. 451 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1988) (allowing an individual to contribute nonexempt property, income from a patent held in the name of the owner, for purposes of new value exception). For further discussion of this question, see Raymond T. Nimmer, Negotiated Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans: Absolute Priority and New Value Contributions, 36 EMORY LJ. 1009, 1068–82 (1987); Ralph A. Peeples, Staying In: Chapter 11, Close Corporations and the Absolute Priority Rule, 63 AM. BANKR. LJ. 65 (1989).


chapter 11. Compare this to the eighty public companies that filed during all of calendar year 2005.9

As rocky as the relationship is, it is about to get rockier. The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) of 200510 contains a host of changes for individual debtors under chapter 11. Driven in large part by Congress’s desire to impose a means test in chapter 7 individual cases,11 and to have bankruptcy relief keyed to a lack of future income rather than to a lack of current assets,12 these amendments work fundamental changes in the way chapter 11 treats individuals.

This article attempts to summarize BAPCPA’s major changes for individuals in chapter 11. As a heuristic for this examination, the article suggests that Congress underplayed the scope and import of these changes by the manner in which the changes were incorporated into existing chapter 11. A better way to achieve the changes sought—and to avoid many policy and implementation errors—would have been to create a separate subchapter, modeling it on the way chapter 11 now treats railroad reorganizations13 or the way chapter 7 treats stockbrokers.14 Had that drafting choice been made, many of the drafting ambiguities and infelicities might have been caught. As it is, however, one is left with a motley sub rosa subchapter, which will generate wasted effort for lawyers and pain for debtors.

II. THE CONCEPT OF A SUBCHAPTER

As the title implies, this article will attempt to show that BAPCPA created a new type of reorganization applicable only to individuals. One way to understand BAPCPA’s provisions is to think of how the amendments might have been incorporated in contexts already understood and used. One such context is the “subchapter.”

A. Legislative Drafting and the “Subchapter”

As noted in the House Legislative Counsel’s Manual on Drafting Style:

No. 1] THE SUB ROSA SUBCHAPTER

To be a good tool, style should be defined clearly. It should be one of the steady, predictable elements that attorneys use to reduce chaos to order, and not one of the fluctuating factors that contribute to the chaos. A good uniform style is one that gives clearly defined, steady, and predictable guidance for the structure and expression of legislation.\textsuperscript{15}

A subchapter is a designated segment lower than a chapter, but higher than a division.\textsuperscript{16} Although not mandatory, the style guidelines indicate a subchapter is appropriate when the basic structure or functions of the chapter are applicable, but variation is required because of common features or elements of a particular class of cases.

\textbf{B. Existing Subchapters}

This subchapter concept is already found in chapter 11. For example, though many are not familiar with subchapter IV of chapter 11, that subchapter governs the reorganization of railroads.\textsuperscript{17} This subchapter’s roots are the longest of any statutory provision related to reorganizations.\textsuperscript{18} Based on the 1933 addition of section 77 to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,\textsuperscript{19} this subchapter retains the basic chapter 11 reorganization structure, but alters it in key ways to adapt the form to the needs of railroads. Among these alterations is the elimination of creditor committees, accomplished simply by stating, in the first section of the subchapter, that § 1104\textsuperscript{20} of the general chapter does not apply.\textsuperscript{21} In addition, the subchapter eliminates the “best interests” test of § 1129(a)(7).\textsuperscript{22}

The subchapter adds as well as subtracts. Section 1171\textsuperscript{23} of the subchapter supplements § 507’s\textsuperscript{24} priority scheme with additional priorities, based on practice in the equity receiverships that preceded section 77’s enactment.\textsuperscript{25} Additional requirements for confirmation apply, including

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{15} The Office of the Legislative Counsel, U.S. House of Representatives, House Legislative Counsel’s Manual on Drafting Style 7 (1995).
  \item \textsuperscript{16} Legislative Computer Sys., U.S. House of Representatives, Drafting Legislative Documents 63, 218 (2004).
  \item \textsuperscript{17} See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1161–1174.
  \item \textsuperscript{18} See S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 9, 11 (1978) (noting that subchapter IV of chapter 11 was an extension of railroad reorganization guidelines passed in the 1930s that had remained “essentially unchanged” since 1935, whereas the other reorganization subchapters were based primarily on later legislation passed as part of bankruptcy reforms in 1938), \textit{reprinted in} 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5795, 5797.
  \item \textsuperscript{19} Section 77 provided for relief for railroad corporations. Act of Mar. 3, 1933, ch. 204, § 77, 47 Stat. 1467, 1474 (1933).
  \item \textsuperscript{20} 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (2000).
  \item \textsuperscript{21} Id. § 1161.
  \item \textsuperscript{22} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{23} Id. § 1171.
  \item \textsuperscript{24} Id. § 507.
  \item \textsuperscript{25} Id. § 1171; see Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Bankruptcy Law for Productivity, 37 Wake Forest L. Rev. 51, 67–68 (2002) (discussing equitable receiverships in railroad bankruptcies prior to 1933).
\end{itemize}
references to specific factors, a different test for feasibility,\(^{26}\) and a specific direction to consider the public interest.\(^ {27}\)

Similar uses of the subchapter format appear in chapter 7. Subchapter III of that chapter has special provisions for stockbroker liquidations,\(^ {28}\) and subchapter IV provides separately for the liquidation of commodity brokers.\(^ {29}\) Subchapter V contains provisions for the liquidation of clearing banks.\(^ {30}\) In each of these subchapters, the basic function of chapter 7—liquidation—is preserved; but, special treatment is given to certain types of creditors,\(^ {31}\) or direction is given that other laws may control the ultimate liquidation.\(^ {32}\)

Under this logic, chapter 12, which covers family farmers and fishermen, could and probably should have been a subchapter of chapter 13. As with subchapter IV of chapter 11, which deals with railroad reorganizations, chapter 12 makes only a few variations from the main provisions of chapter 13, but these variations are significant. A chapter 12 plan, for example, may modify a claim secured by the debtor’s principal residence.\(^ {33}\) The plan is not limited to five years.\(^ {34}\) Further, while there is the possibility of dispossessing the debtor as debtor in possession, there is also the possibility that a debtor may regain his position as estate fiduciary.\(^ {35}\) These changes do not run all in one direction; a chapter 13 discharge is broader than the chapter 12 discharge. For example, the chapter 12 debtor is subject to all of the nondischargeability claims found in § 523.\(^ {36}\)

The point here is that structure can aid function. Lawyers and judges can give better effect to a statute’s purpose when the structure used within the statute clarifies that purpose. Especially with respect to subchapters, Congress can signal its intent that similar, but not identical, treatment is necessary for certain classes of debtors. When Congress declines to use such signaling devices, however, lawyers and judges are left to wonder whether unspecified consequences are intended, or unanticipated.

\(^{27}\) Id. § 1173(a)(4).
\(^{28}\) See id. §§ 741–752.
\(^{30}\) See id. §§ 781–784 (2000).
\(^{31}\) Holders of certain types of financial contracts in stockbroker liquidations, for example, receive preferential treatment not found in other sections of the Bankruptcy Code. See id. § 741.
\(^{32}\) The Commodity Futures Trading Commission must get notice of all actions, and may appear and be heard, for example, in commodity broker liquidations. Id. § 762.
\(^{33}\) Compare id. § 1222(b), with id. § 1322(b)(2).
\(^{34}\) Id. § 1222(b)(9).
\(^{35}\) Id. § 1204.
\(^{36}\) Compare id. § 1228(a), with id. § 1328(a).
III. THE CHANGES

A separate segmentation of chapter 11 for individuals would help only if the changes made were sufficiently significant to justify the separate treatment. The claim that the new individual reorganization provisions effectively constitute such a subchapter—albeit a sub rosa one—ultimately turns on the effect of Congress’s changes. After first looking at the origins of these provisions, this article examines the amendments in some detail. This article then compares the overall treatment effected by these changes to the treatment a chapter 13 case would provide.

A. Origins and Legislative History—How Did We Get Here?

The Senate Judiciary Committee first discussed special provisions for individual chapter 11 debtors in 1999. At that time, in a markup to the then-current bankruptcy reform bill, section 321 was added to read as follows:

SEC. 321. TREATMENT OF CERTAIN EARNINGS OF AN INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR WHO FILES A VOLUNTARY CASE UNDER CHAPTER 11.

Section 541(a)(6) of title 11, United States Code, is amended by inserting “(other than an individual debtor who, in accordance with section 301, files a petition to commence a voluntary case under chapter 11)” after “individual debtor”. 37

The amendment did not go without comment. Senators Leahy, Kennedy, Feingold, and Schumer added the following in their Minority Views section of the Senate Report:

At the Judiciary Committee markup, Senator Grassley successfully introduced an amendment to include postpetition earnings for individual chapter 11 debtors as “property of the estate.” This so-called “super-rich” amendment, which would have been considered rather controversial had it been vetted among the bankruptcy community, is undoubtedly a significant change to bankruptcy law but is not the direct or most effective method of controlling higher income debtors and in any event is not responsive to our concerns regarding the disparate effects of the bill. 39

37. S. 625, 106th Cong. § 321 (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, May 11, 1999). The provision was not in the bill as introduced in the Senate. S. 625, 106th Cong. (as introduced in Senate, Mar. 16, 1999).

38. S. REP. NO. 106-49, at 17 (1999). The report indicates that the amendment was offered by Senator Grassley of Iowa, and that it passed by a vote of 12-5, with Senators Leahy, Kennedy, Biden, Kohl and Feingold voting nay. Id. at 17.

39. Id. at 114 n.43.
At the same time the Senate debated Senate Bill 625, the House considered a companion bill, House Bill 833. House Bill 833 passed the House on May 5, 1999 and was received in the Senate soon thereafter. The bill as received did not have any provisions for individual chapter 11 debtors. During Senate consideration, however, the Grassley amendment from Senate Bill 625 was inserted and, more importantly, expanded. As a result, when the Senate ultimately passed House Bill 833, section 321 of the bill not only contained a new amendment to § 1115 regarding personal service income, but also contained additional amendments that applied only to individuals. The list is short, but significant:

Section 1123 of the Code was amended to require an individual’s devotion of her postpetition service and other income as necessary to implement the plan.

A “projected disposable income” test was added to § 1129(a) as new paragraph (14).

An individual’s discharge was delayed until the completion of plan payments; and

A new section on plan modification was inserted.

Congress passed the substance of House Bill 833 after the 2000 elections. However, President Clinton refused to sign the bill, and it was thus “pocket-vetoed.” As a result, bankruptcy reform had to be reintroduced in the 107th Congress.

Reintroduction came soon: On January 31, 2001, House Bill 333 was introduced in the House. This version contained the expanded version of Senator Grassley’s amendment, which had passed both the House and the Senate during the previous session. After some minor changes to

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42. H.R. 833 (as received in Senate, May 12, 1999).
44. H.R. 833 § 321(a)(1) (as passed by Senate, Feb. 2, 2000).
45. Id. § 321(b)–(e).
46. Id. § 321(b)(3).
47. Id. § 321(c)(1).
48. Id. § 321(d)(2).
49. Id. § 321(e).
50. H.R. 833 (as passed by Senate, Feb. 2, 2000).
the overall bill. The House issued a report and promptly passed the bill. The report contains the first extended discussion of the expansion of Senator Grassley’s amendment.

House Bill 333 ultimately went to conference in 2001. At conference, the House conferees agreed to the Senate’s text, and issued a conference report. The report contained a description of the expanded amendment that was almost word-for-word the text used in the earlier House Report. This treatment, though somewhat extensive, is purely descriptive. There is no discussion of the policy behind, or purposes of, these changes. This silence was a hallmark of all successive versions of the bill, none of which altered the text of section 321.

Thus, although not entirely free from doubt, it appears that the individual chapter 11 provisions were inserted as adjuncts to means testing to ensure no easy escape from chapter 7. As characterized by the Senate minority, who opposed the provisions when they were first offered, the provisions were intended for the “super-rich.” As enacted, however, these provisions do not just affect the “super-rich,” as this article will now demonstrate through a detailed analysis.

B. The Changes in Detail

Section 321 of BAPCPA carried forward several changes, discussed since 1999, that apply to individual chapter 11 debtors. The changes start with the original provision, which altered the nature of property of the estate.

1. Postpetition Earnings from Services Are Property of the Estate—§ 1115

Section 321(a) of BAPCPA added § 1115 to the Bankruptcy Code. This section defines property of the estate for each individual chapter 11 case. Section 1115’s text is based on and is almost identical to existing § 1306, which is applicable only in chapter 13 cases. Both sections sup-

54. The bill was amended in committee to add what is now § 1115(b), which allows the debtor to remain in possession of postpetition service income. See 147 CONG. REC. H548 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2001).
58. See Jensen, supra note 51, at 548–49.
plement the estate with property that is excluded from the estate in an individual’s chapter 7 case: postpetition earnings from services.65

This expansion of property of the estate includes income from services performed postpetition,66 and ensures that this additional property, which usually is necessary to fund or otherwise implement a plan of reorganization67 is protected by the automatic stay.68 This is even the case with respect to claimants who could pursue such property in a chapter 7 case, such as those holding postpetition claims.69

This inclusion of postpetition service income, however, did not change other provisions in title 11 that rely on § 541’s definition of estate property, such as the “best-interests-of-creditors” test found in chapter 11.70 There is also no requirement that property coming into the estate due only to the operation of § 1115(a) be listed in the schedules. Obviously, such a requirement would be unworkable, since the debtor’s schedules would have to be amended to reflect each paycheck or acquisition of property, as well as every expenditure.

While § 1115(a) adds this additional property to the estate, § 1115(b) confirms the debtor’s presumptive right to remain in possession of that property, as well as all other property of the estate.71 As in pre-BAPCPA chapter 13 cases, the right to remain in possession of this property of the estate is a major advantage for individual chapter 11 debtors. In a chapter 7 case, these debtors would have to turn over non-exempt property to the trustee.72

2. Use of § 1115 Property to Fund a Plan—§ 1123(a)(8)

To ensure that a debtor devotes § 1115 income to plan implementation and creditor claims, section 321(b) of BAPCPA added § 1123(a)(8). This provision requires the individual chapter 11 debtor’s plan to provide

67. Id., § 321(b)(3), 119 Stat. at 95 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(8)) (requiring an individual chapter 11 debtor to include such income from postpetition services as is necessary to implement the plan).
68. The chapter 13 cases construing cognate language in § 1306 establish this principle. See, e.g., Security Bank of Marshalltown, Iowa v. Neiman, 1 F.3d 687 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting that chapter 13 estate continues to exist after confirmation of plan, so expenses to protect estate property were administrative expenses); Carver v. Carver, 954 F.2d 1573 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that debtor’s wages were property of estate and therefore action to collect alimony from those wages was not a § 362(b)(2) exception to automatic stay); Annese v. Kolenda (In re Kolenda), 212 B.R. 851 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (providing that property acquired postpetition remains in estate after confirmation and is protected by automatic stay); Clark v. United States (In re Clark), 207 B.R. 559 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1997) (holding that all property of debtor was property of estate protected by automatic stay after confirmation of plan when order confirming the plan so provided).
“all or such portion of earnings from personal services . . . or other future income . . . as is necessary for the execution of the plan.”\textsuperscript{73} This provision apparently ensures that an individual debtor will devote an amount equal to his or her personal service income to the plan. However, for reasons explored later, the provision may not be sufficient to achieve that task.

3. Disposable Income Requirement Imported from Chapter 13—\textsuperscript{73} § 1129(a)(15)

Section 1129(a)(15), added by section 321(c) of BAPCPA, requires individual chapter 11 debtors to either pay all allowed unsecured claims in full,\textsuperscript{74} or devote an amount equal to five years’ worth of the debtor’s projected disposable income to property to be distributed under the plan.\textsuperscript{75} As with the best interest of creditors test found in § 1129(a)(7), standing to object on this ground is not class based; it is irrelevant that the plan proponent obtained the consent of the class of unsecured creditors so long as there is one objecting unsecured creditor.

The concept of “projected disposable income” and the amounts of such disposable income that must be devoted to the implementation of the plan are central to the application of this provision. “Disposable income” is a concept borrowed from chapter 13.\textsuperscript{76} Indeed, § 1129(a)(15) refers to § 1325(b)(2) for a definition of the concept.\textsuperscript{77}

Under § 1129(a)(15), the plan must distribute property equal in value to the debtor’s projected disposable income over the five-year period beginning on the date that the first payment is due under the plan.\textsuperscript{78} The confirmation requirement thus specifies the amount of all payments.

Although based on chapter 13 practice, this confirmation requirement differs in several respects. First, it differs as to time. Under chapter 13, a debtor’s plan must extend for three years (in some cases five years) unless the plan provides for earlier payment of all unsecured claims in full.\textsuperscript{79} Section 1129(a)(15) does not specify a minimum period, but does specify that the value of the property to be distributed under the plan must not be “less than the projected disposable income of the debtor . . . to be received during the 5-year period” beginning with the start of plan payments.\textsuperscript{80} Thus, if property from any other source—such as loans or gifts, or from exempt property—is used to supplement the

\textsuperscript{73} BAPCPA § 321(b)(3), 119 Stat. at 95 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(8)).
\textsuperscript{74} Id. § 321(c)(1) (codified in part at 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(15)(A)).
\textsuperscript{75} Id. (codified in part at 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(15)(B)).
\textsuperscript{77} BAPCPA § 321(c)(1) (codified in part at 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(15)(B)).”
\textsuperscript{78} Id.
\textsuperscript{79} Id. § 318(3), 119 Stat. at 93–94 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4)).
\textsuperscript{80} Id. § 321(c)(1) (codified in part at 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(15)(B)).
payments to unsecured creditors, the plan may be shorter than five years.  

Chapter 13 also limits the maximum plan length to five years.  

Section 1129(a)(15) explicitly permits longer plans by requiring that a minimum amount of property to be devoted to the plan, and by linking that amount to the debtor’s projected disposable income for the five years following confirmation or “the period for which the plan provides payments, whichever is longer.”  

Finally, chapter 13 requires payments to begin within thirty days of commencement of the case, regardless of whether the plan is confirmed. Chapter 13 then measures the plan period from the first scheduled payment to unsecured creditors. Under § 1129(a)(15)(B), however, the minimum five-year period begins on the “date that the first payment is due under the plan,” which usually will be after confirmation.

4. Delayed Entry of the Discharge Imported from Chapter 13—§ 1141(d)(5)  

Section 321(d) of BAPCPA changed the date on which an individual chapter 11 debtor receives his or her discharge. Before BAPCPA, all debtors received their discharge when their plan was confirmed, regardless of whether all (or any) plan payments were made. Section 321(d) added § 1141(d)(5), which changes the discharge date, to chapter 11. For cases covered by BAPCPA, the discharge is now issued “on completion of all payments under the plan.”

5. Changes to Modification of Plans—Incorporating § 1329(a) (sort of) into § 1127(e)  

The delay of discharge for individuals makes the terms of modification more important; if assumptions made at confirmation prove erroneous, modification will be necessary in order to issue a discharge. Section

81. This view is supported by 11 U.S.C.A § 1123(a)(8) (West Supp. 2006), which requires an individual debtor’s plan to include all postpetition earnings from services to the extent necessary to implement the plan, but does not specify any minimum period.

82. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d) (2000); see also BAPCPA § 318(3) (codified in part at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4)(A)(i)–(ii)).

83. BAPCPA § 321(c)(1) (codified in part at 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(15)(B)).


86. BAPCPA § 321(c)(1) (codified in part at 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(15)(B)).

87. See id. § 321(d), 119 Stat. at 95–96 (codified in part at 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)).


89. BAPCPA § 321(d).

90. Id. § 321(d)(2) (codified in part at 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(5)(A)). This is a provision that permits an earlier discharge in certain circumstances. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.c.
321(e) of BAPCPA addressed this issue by adding § 1127(e) to the Code. This new section allows individual debtors (along with trustees and unsecured creditors) to modify the plan to increase or reduce payments, as well as repayment periods, under the plan, so long as other confirmation requirements are met.

6. Additional Confirmation Requirements—11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(14) and BAPCPA Section 1228(b)

In addition to the changes made by section 321 of BAPCPA, other significant changes were made to the confirmation requirements imposed on individual debtors. Chapter 11 debtors will now have to ensure that their postpetition domestic support obligations are current as of confirmation. In addition, in an uncodified portion of BAPCPA, Congress required individual debtors to prove that they have provided all tax information that was requested preconfirmation.

C. Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 Compared

There is a tendency to look at the changes to chapter 11 and assume that the only difference for individuals between chapter 13 and chapter 11 is the debt limitations. This might lead one to conclude that the new chapter 11 provisions are really a subspecies of chapter 13. However, that would be problematic and likely wrong. There are some significant differences between chapter 11 and chapter 13, as illustrated by the following:

- If the debtor could file under either chapter 11 or chapter 13, and is engaged in business, the small business provisions of chapter 11 will likely apply if the debtor files under chapter 11, but will not if the debtor files under chapter 13.

- Chapter 11 has a more expensive filing fee: $1039 versus $274.

- There is no automatic co-debtor stay in chapter 11.

- Chapter 11 does not contain a statutory authorization for separate classification of debts for which the debtor is co liable.
The valuation standard contained in § 506(a)(2), requiring retail valuation, does not apply in chapter 11.

Disposable income under chapter 11 need only be part of the “property to be distributed under the plan,” which presumably means some of it may be devoted to secured creditors and postpetition administrative claimants; in chapter 13, disposable income must be distributed for the benefit of unsecured creditors.

The anticramdown provision added by section 306(b) of BAPCPA to § 1325(a), which prohibits bifurcation of certain purchase money secured claims if the secured creditor is undersecured, does not apply in chapter 11.

The chapter 11 disposable income test found in § 1129(a)(15) may not incorporate the IRS expense limits applicable to some chapter 13 debtors. Section 1129(a)(15) refers only to § 1325(b)(2), which calculates disposable income with reference to the debtor’s actual expenses, but not to § 1325(b)(3), which incorporates the IRS collection standards set out in § 707(b)(2) for debtors whose income is above the applicable median income for their state.

Creditors must be solicited and get to vote on a chapter 11 plan; there is no creditor voting in chapter 13.

The minimum plan length is calculated differently in chapter 13 and chapter 11. For some cases, chapter 13 plans can be less than five years; chapter 11 may require that the debtor devote at least five years’ worth of disposable income to his plan.

The maximum plan length also differs in chapter 13 and chapter 11. In chapter 13, no plan may last longer than five years; chapter 11 plans may extend over a longer period of time.

Payments under chapter 11 plans do not usually commence until after confirmation, which may be significantly later than the fil-

99. Cf. id. § 1322(b)(1) (extending such classification only to consumer debts).
100. BAPCPA § 321(b)(3), 119 Stat. at 95 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(8)).
102. Id. § 306(b), 119 Stat. at 80 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)).
103. See infra Part IV.B.2.a.
106. Id. § 321(c)(1), 119 Stat. at 95 (codified in part at 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(15)(B)).
107. Id. § 318(3), 119 Stat. at 93 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(4)).
108. Id. § 321(c)(1), 119 Stat. at 95 (codified in part at 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(15)(B)).
ing date;\textsuperscript{109} chapter 13 plans must be filed within fifteen days of the filing date;\textsuperscript{110} and chapter 13 debtors begin paying the designated plan amounts before plan confirmation.\textsuperscript{111}

- A chapter 13 debtor may discharge certain marital property settlements to the extent that the settlements are covered by § 523(a)(15), and may discharge some forms of willful and malicious injury that do not involve personal injury or death.\textsuperscript{112}

- A chapter 11 discharge for inability to complete a plan appears to be somewhat easier to obtain than a chapter 13 hardship discharge.\textsuperscript{113}

- Chapter 13 debtors must complete a course in financial education as a condition to receiving their discharge;\textsuperscript{114} no such education requirement is applicable to chapter 11 debtors.

IV. THE EFFECTS OF THE CHANGES: WOULD A SUBCHAPTER HAVE HELPED?

As section 321 of BAPCPA provided for only five relatively small changes to chapter 11 for individuals, the claim that individuals deserve their own subchapter may seem to be much ado about nothing.\textsuperscript{115} However, as the effects of these changes ripple through chapter 11, they cause significant changes in the way cases can and should be administered. These effects may be divided into three areas: administration before confirmation, confirmation, and postconfirmation.

A. Issues During Administration, but Before Confirmation

Critics complained about what happens in the gap between filing the case and confirming a plan, the so-called administrative period.\textsuperscript{116}

\textsuperscript{109} See In re Haiflich, 63 B.R. 314 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1986) (requiring a filing amendment due to interest accrued between the September 1984 filing and the November 1985 confirmation).
\textsuperscript{110} FED. R. BANKR. P. 3015(b).
\textsuperscript{113} Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b)(1) (2000) (“[T]he court may grant a discharge to a debtor that has not completed payments under the plan only if the debtor’s failure to complete payments is due to circumstances for which the debtor should not justly be held accountable . . . .”), with 11 U.S.C.A. § 1141(d)(5)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 2006) (allowing discharge without completion of the plan if modification of the plan is not practicable).
\textsuperscript{115} See, e.g., Leif M. Clark, Chapter 11: Does One Size Fit All?, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 167, 188-89 (1996) (concluding that one form of relief for all entities is appropriate if judges who administer the system are adequately trained).
\textsuperscript{116} As Judge Edith Jones stated, “Chapter 11 is more an intensive-care ward (or a mortuary) than a healing potion for sick businesses.” Edith H. Jones, Chapter 11: A Death Penalty for Debtor and Creditor Interests, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1088, 1089 (1992); see also In re Maxim Indus., Inc., 22 B.R. 611, 613 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982) (“Bankruptcy is perceived as a haven for wistfulness and the
Congress addressed some of those concerns in BAPCPA by limiting the debtor’s exclusivity and by generally encouraging judges to be active in the administration and swift progress of chapter 11 cases. But BAPCPA’s changes may have exacerbated these problems and caused others.

1. Personal Living Expenses

Under chapter 13, debtors must file their plan within fifteen days of commencing the case and begin payments under the proposed plan before confirmation. By contrast, chapter 11 does not require a plan to be filed at all—it simply provides for conversion or dismissal if a confirmable plan is not filed within a reasonable time. As a result, in chapter 11 cases there often will be a significant time gap between the commencement of the case and the confirmation of a plan.

But what about paying expenses necessary to get the debtor to confirmation? In particular, what about a debtor’s personal living expenses? Recall that new § 1115 brings into the estate all postpetition service income, but thereafter provides no real guidance as to how that income may be spent preconfirmation. Ideally, income could just accumulate, but few debtors could afford to work for a wage and not pay any bills. If, however, those expenses are “actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving the estate,” such as maintenance payments on a principal asset, then they should qualify as administrative expenses and may be paid, presumably in the ordinary course.

What about expenses that may not be necessary to preserve the estate, but which were part of the debtor’s prepetition expenses? Many personal expenses of everyday folk are not “necessary” to preserve the “estate.” Examples include payments on a country club membership, a

optimist’s Valhalla where the atmosphere is conducive to fantasy and miraculous dreams of the phoenix rising from the ruins. Unfortunately, this Court is not held during the full moon, and while the rays of sunshine sometimes bring the warming rays of the sun, they more often also bring the bright light that makes transparent and evaporates the elaborate financial fantasies constructed of nothing more than the gossamer wings and of sophisticated tax legerdemain.”).


118. See, e.g., id. § 440, 119 Stat. at 114 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 105(d)(1)).

119. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3015(b).

120. BAPCPA § 309(c)(2), 119 Stat. at 83 (codified in part at 11 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(1)) (requiring plan payments to commence at the earlier of 30 days after filing the plan or after the order for relief).

121. Id. § 442(a), 119 Stat. at 116 (codified in part at 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(J)) (listing failure to file a plan within the time fixed by the court or Code as a ground for conversion or dismissal).

122. The notable exception would be prepackaged chapter 11 plans, authorized in part by section 402 of BAPCPA, 119 Stat. at 104 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 341(e)), and section 408 of BAPCPA, 119 Stat. at 106 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1125(g)).

123. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (2000). Taxes also will qualify as administrative expenses that may be paid in the ordinary course. Id. § 503(b)(1)(B).
vacation, or even something as prosaic as the daily hit at Starbucks.\textsuperscript{124} There appears to be no statutory provision authorizing these types of payments.

These ordinary but not necessary expenses are handled in chapter 13 by § 1325, which allows the debtor to include as a deduction against disposable income those costs that are reasonably necessary for the “maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.”\textsuperscript{125} Although new § 1129(a)(15) cross-references § 1325(b), § 1129(a)(15) applies only to plan confirmation. Thus § 1129 applies only to payments to be distributed under the confirmed plan, which typically will be after confirmation.\textsuperscript{126} Indeed, if these expenses do not qualify as administrative expenses payable in full on confirmation, it appears there may be no authorization for them. This means that, at the extreme, the expenses could be recovered under § 549.\textsuperscript{127}

2. **Professional Expenses**

Payment to the debtor’s professional agents also presents a concern with respect to the changes wrought by § 1115. It is quite likely that the debtor’s lawyer will have significant postfiling bills and will need to know (and will deserve to know) how to be paid. This is not a problem in chapter 13, as there is explicit recognition of the ability of a professional for a chapter 13 debtor to receive reasonable compensation “for representing the interests of the debtor.”\textsuperscript{128}

No such provision exists for lawyers representing individual chapter 11 debtors. The chapter 11 debtor’s lawyer would thus presumably be covered by \textit{Lamie v. United States Trustee},\textsuperscript{129} and could not receive compensation from the estate.\textsuperscript{130} The zone of noncompensation would appear to cover advice as to exemptions, or advice on plan structuring if the plan allocates some of the estate for the debtor postconfirmation, as expenses in these areas would benefit the debtor, and not the bankruptcy estate. Further, efforts to obtain sufficient funds prepetition to cover an-

\begin{footnotes}
\item[124] At the extreme end, expenses for others that are not legally required, such as support for an elderly parent, are not strictly necessary to preserve the estate—but few outside of bankruptcy would quibble that a debtor should make such payments, and that the debtor should keep making them after filing.
\item[125] BAPCPA § 102(h), 119 Stat. at 33–34 (codified in part at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)(A)(i)).
\item[126] In addition, § 1129(a)(15) will not apply if no creditor objects. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129(a)(15) (West Supp. 2006).
\item[127] This might have a perverse effect on the best interests test and on preplan disclosure; some courts require the disclosure statement to outline the effect of avoidance power recoveries from insiders. \textit{See, e.g., In re Sierra-Cal}, 210 B.R. 168, 176–77 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1997).
\item[128] 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(4)(B) (2000). This also applies to lawyers for chapter 12 debtors. \textit{Id.}
\item[129] \textit{Lamie v. United States Tr.}, 540 U.S. 526 (2004).
\item[130] \textit{Id.} at 541–42 (denying a chapter 7 debtor’s lawyer compensation from the estate).
\end{footnotes}
ticipated services may create causes of action under the avoiding actions, and thus raise questions of disinterestedness.131

3. Taxes and Support Payments

After BAPCPA, keeping current on taxes and support payments is critical. An individual’s failure to pay taxes or timely file tax returns may constitute cause for dismissal,132 as may the failure to pay any domestic support obligation that comes due after the filing.133 In addition, failure to keep these expenses current may preclude confirmation because both taxes and support payments are priority claims,134 subject to a separate confirmation provision.135

B. Confirmation Issues

If the debtor is able to stay in chapter 11, and proposes a plan, there are several impediments, or uncertainties, regarding confirmation. These problems are dealt with as part of all confirmations under the heading of “all” confirmations, and as part of nonconsensual confirmations.

1. All Confirmations

BAPCPA added several paragraphs to § 1129(a), which deals with consensual confirmation; that is, confirmation accompanied by the assent of all classes of claims.

a. Best Interests Test and Service-Related Income

A central requirement of confirmation is the so-called best interests test; that is, the plan proponent must demonstrate that each and every nonconsenting, impaired creditor will receive more in reorganization than in liquidation.136 One nonobvious fallout of the BAPCPA amendments is that the intersection of § 1115 and § 348 may render the “best interests” test immaterial in any case in which the debtor has significant postpetition income.


133. Id. (codified in part at 11 U.S.C. § 1112(b)(4)(P)).


135. Id. § 507(a)(1) (domestic support obligations); id. § 507(a)(8) (taxes); id. § 1129(a)(9)(A) (postpetition taxes); id. § 1129(a)(14) (postpetition domestic support obligations).

This odd result is dictated by the fact that, were a chapter 11 individual debtor to convert to chapter 7, § 1115 would no longer apply. All the postpetition income from services brought into the estate from and after filing would revert back to the debtor (and the debtor might even have a claim for a rebate) via the operation of § 348, which tells courts that, in converted cases, the estate is deemed to have been created as of the filing date. This would have the effect of recharacterizing all service income brought into the estate under § 1115 as property of the debtor under § 541(a)(6).

This was generally thought to be the result under chapter 13 as originally enacted. Congress, however, thought clarity was of sufficient importance to amend § 348 in 1994 to add subsection (f), which essentially clarifies that there is a reversion of postpetition service income to the debtor. BAPCPA did not modify § 348 to extend the same treatment to conversions from chapter 11 to chapter 7, so there remains some uncertainty over exactly how to calculate the value of the hypothetical chapter 7 estate. For this reason, the pre-BAPCPA cases examining the scope of § 541(a)(6) in individual chapter 11 cases will retain vitality.

b. Treatment of Privileged Creditors

Individuals also have to treat certain classes of creditors differently. Postpetition domestic support obligations must be current to confirm a chapter 11 plan. An uncodified provision of BAPCPA requires all “requested tax documents,” presumably all tax returns at a minimum, to be filed. A minor concern exists in that BAPCPA did not modify § 1122 to accommodate these necessary changes; chapter 13, which borrows the classification standard from chapter 11, specifically allows the debtor to separately class favored classes of co-debtors.

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137. One might quibble that the debtor would have to meet the means test of § 707(b)(2) in order to convert, but that conclusion is not certain; § 707(b)(1) would seem to extend the means test to “a case filed by an individual debtor under this chapter.” 11 U.S.C.A. § 707(b)(1) (West Supp. 2006) (emphasis added).


140. Id. § 316.1. The main changes are found at 11 U.S.C. § 348(f)(1)(A).

141. See, e.g., FitzSimmons v. Walsh (In re FitzSimmons), 725 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1984); In re Harp, 166 B.R. 740 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1993); In re Herberman, 122 B.R. 273 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990).


143. Id. § 1228(b), 119 Stat. at 200.

144. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1) (2000). I acknowledge that similar changes were made with respect to the current status of domestic support obligations for chapter 13 plan confirmations, and also without modification of § 1322.
c. Good Faith

Good faith will change for individual chapter 11 debtors. Before BAPCPA, the focus in individual cases was the devotion of sufficient income to pay creditors.\textsuperscript{145} Some courts had even adopted chapter 13’s disposable income test as an index of good faith.\textsuperscript{146} But the change to § 1123(a)(8), requiring the provision of an amount equal to at least five years’ worth of projected disposable income to a plan, effectively requires debtors to devote all their service income to the plan. Thus, BAPCPA undercuts the notion that good faith means that the debtor should provide maximum income. Courts will therefore have to shift their focus in individual cases to other, more traditional, indices of good faith.

d. Feasibility and Nondischargeable Debts

Every chapter 11 plan proponent must show that, under the plan, reorganization is not likely to be followed by the need to liquidate or reorganize further.\textsuperscript{147} This so-called feasibility requirement ensures that reorganization has a lasting quality.

BAPCPA made this feasibility determination more difficult for the individual debtor. Even though BAPCPA changed chapter 11 to provide that an individual’s discharge is delayed until completion of the plan,\textsuperscript{148} the deadline for filing nondischargeability complaints has not been extended.\textsuperscript{149} Given that complaints for fraud and other defalcations must be filed within sixty days of the conclusion of the first meeting of creditors under § 341(a),\textsuperscript{150} creditors will be pressured to file a complaint before that time, or request an extension. Because the outcome of these adversary proceedings may make the difference between a complete and incomplete payment, no plan will be confirmed without some showing that it is more likely than not that the debtor will prevail on the dischargeability claim. Thus, BAPCPA forces a fast and rough estimation of the debtor’s chances in order to confirm a plan,\textsuperscript{151} or a postponement of the confirmation until such claims are known.\textsuperscript{152}

\textsuperscript{145} In re Harman, 141 B.R. 878 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992); In re Kemp, 134 B.R. 413 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1991); 7 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.03[3][a][ii][A] (15th ed. rev. 2006); see Neely, supra note 1, at 18–20.
\textsuperscript{148} See BAPCPA § 321(d), 119 Stat. at 95–96 (codified in part at 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(2), (5)).
\textsuperscript{150} FED. R. BANKR. P. 4007(c).
\textsuperscript{151} A creative lawyer might attempt to use 11 U.S.C. § 502(c) (2000) to estimate the amount of the nondischargeable claim for purposes of confirmation, but that action itself will take time.
\textsuperscript{152} If the debtor is also a small business debtor, however, the time within which to file and confirm a plan are substantially circumscribed. A small business debtor must file his plan within 300 days
2. Nonconsensual Confirmations

Chapter 11 raises the possibility of nonconsensual confirmation; that is, confirmation without the assent of all classes of claims. Because of the structure of § 1129(b), a plan proponent must meet both the nonconsensual requirements, and all the consensual requirements (except, of course, for the requirement that all classes consent). Given the structure of the BAPCPA amendments, however, this class-based system of confirmation may no longer effectively apply to individuals.

a. Projected Disposable Income

A central feature of BAPCPA’s amendments was the addition of § 1129(a)(15). Even though this provision is found in the consensual confirmation requirements, it applies only if a “holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to the confirmation of the plan.” Thus, not only may every creditor press the “best interests” test of § 1129(a)(7), every unsecured creditor may also press § 1129(a)(15)’s disposable income test.

This test, borrowed almost verbatim from chapter 13, requires the debtor to devote an amount equal to five years’ worth of projected disposable income to the plan, with the five years measured from the date the plan is confirmed or plan payments start, whichever is later. This will provide a playground for creative lawyers. One question that arises is whether § 1129(a)(15) requires all actual service-related income to be devoted to the plan, or only an amount equal to the projected disposable income, determined as of confirmation. The issue might arise in the following case: say that a debtor owns significant real estate, and the plan calls for its sale. Assume that the net proceeds from the sale exceed the debtor’s projected salary (or consulting agreement payments) for the five-year period. Has the debtor met this provision by offering up the property?

Finally, although the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules does not think so, it is not beyond cavil that § 1129(a)(15)’s reference to § 1325(b)(2) incorporates the means test expenses from § 707(b). Section 707(b)(2)’s expenses are incorporated into chapter 13 by...
§ 1325(b)(3), which is not specifically referred to in § 1129(a)(15). But the lead in to § 1325(b)(3) states that it is to be used to calculate the “[a]mounts reasonably necessary to be expended under [§ 1325(b)(2)].”

Could this mean that § 1325(b)(3)’s reference to § 1325(b)(2) follows any use or reference in the Code to § 1325(b)(2)? In other words, does it follow, in much the same way that the rules of § 102 apply to all words in title 11 without any reference back to § 102, that any reference to § 1325(b)(2) carries it all sections that help define it? Although the Rules Committee’s interpretation will be entitled to deference, it is not the only way to read the statute, thus leaving more uncertainty about the section’s scope.

b. Absolute Priority and Cram Down

Any nonconsensual plan of reorganization must be “fair and equitable,” which has generally been held to require compliance with, among other things, the absolute priority rule. How that rule applies to individuals, however, is a puzzle.

The applicability of the absolute priority rule to individuals and small businesses has always presented confusion. Before 1952, for example, individual debtors under chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act had to propose plans that were “fair and equitable.” Congress deleted the “fair and equitable” requirement from chapter XI in 1952. As the accompanying House Report stated, “the fair and equitable rule . . . cannot be realistically applied in a Chapter XI [action] . . . . Were it so applied, . . . no corporate debtor where the stock ownership is substantially identical with management could effectuate an arrangement except by payment of the claims of all creditors in full.” Currently, chapter 12 and chapter 13 debt adjustment plans do not need to be “fair and equitable” with respect to dissenting creditors. This means, among other things, that plans confirmed under those chapters do not have to satisfy the absolute priority rule.

158. Id. § 102(b)(2).
159. 11 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). The counter argument is that § 103 makes § 102 applicable throughout the Code, whereas there is no similar section that makes any provision in chapter 13 generally applicable to chapter 11 cases.
166. Id.
Even before BAPCPA, courts were in disarray regarding whether an individual debtor could cram down a plan over the dissent of a class of unsecured creditors. While § 1129(a)(15) requires the debtor to commit to the plan property that has a value of certain future income, the absolute priority rule looks to the allocation of prepetition assets. In a corporate reorganization, if there is not enough value to reach a junior class, such as the equity holders, that class is eliminated. Elimination of the “equity” class in an individual case, while not without historical precedent, is something most courts would avoid.

This has caused some to believe that individual debtors cannot effect a nonconsensual confirmation. Others, however, have noted that confirmation can comply with absolute priority through the contribution of exempt assets, or through loans from family, friends, or gullible third parties. Yet, even that aspect is open to some doubt.

c. What Assets May or Must Be Devoted to the Plan—of the Amendment to 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)

The BAPCPA amendments address this conundrum of individual cram down in a roundabout way by changing the statutory example of compliance with absolute priority, found in § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). Section 321 of BAPCPA added the following text to § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii), applicable only in the case of an individual debtor:


As Sally Neely notes:
The debate over whether section 1129(b)(2)(B) applies to individual debtors has recently been fueled by the court of appeals decisions in Security Farms v. General Teamsters Local 890 (In re General Teamsters Local 890), 265 F.3d 869 (9th Cir. 2001) (neither members nor parent labor union of not-for-profit local union held interests for purposes of section 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)), and In re Wabash Valley Power Ass’n, 72 F.3d 1305 (7th Cir. 1995) (members could continue in control of rural electric cooperative without violating the absolute priority rule of § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii)). Neely, supra note 1, at 12.


170.  See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *472 (“[Under Roman law], creditors might cut the debtor’s body into pieces, and each of them take his proportionable share.”); see also Vern Countryman, Bankruptcy and the Individual Debtor—and a Modest Proposal to Return to the Seventeenth Century, 32 CATH. U. L. REV. 809, 810 (1983).

171.  Burks, supra note 167.

172.  In re Henke, 90 B.R. 451 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1988) (allowing an individual to contribute non-exempt property—income from a patent held in the name of the debtor—for purposes of the new value exception).

173.  Some cases have read the use of the term “property” in § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) to include exempt property, which effectively blocks use of that property as a contribution by the debtor for which he or she would receive credit. See, e.g., In re Gosman, 282 B.R. 45 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2002); In re Yasparro, 100 B.R. 91, 99 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989). Contra In re Henderson, 321 B.R. 550, 558–60 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005); In re Egan, 142 B.R. 730, 733 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992).
the debtor may retain property included in the estate under section 1115, subject to the requirements of subsection (a)(14) of this section [related to the satisfaction of all postpetition domestic support obligations].

The problem, however, is that this addition contains a somewhat ambiguous reference to “property included in the estate under section 1115.” At first glance, this section might be read to allow a debtor, so long as he or she meets the projected income test of § 1129(a)(15), to keep all postpetition income from services. But this would be an odd result given the effect of § 1123(a)(8), also added by BAPCPA. It would be the rare case in which a debtor would have any funds left over after pledging an amount equal to five years’ worth of projected income to the plan. This might mean that income from and after the plan’s fifth year could be kept over the dissent of a class of unsecured creditors, but that also seems somewhat odd.

A further oddity is in the language of § 1115 itself. That section states that “property of the estate includes, in addition to the property specified in Section 541” all postpetition income from services. But does this locution bring all of the property snagged by § 541 into the chapter 11 estate, such that a person could say that § 1115, by incorporation, specifies all property of the estate in chapter 11 cases? If so, then the exception in § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) becomes a lot more interesting.

Given the paucity of legislative history on this point, the section’s intended scope is unclear. The reader is left with two widely different results: miserly post-fifth-year income on one side, and generous designation of all estate property on the other.

C. Postconfirmation Issues

BAPCPA also modified the chapter 11 discharge for an individual. Discharge is now delayed until completion of the payments under the plan. This tracks chapter 13 in the main, but leaves some questions open as how to assimilate into the plan the inevitable changes that will occur postconfirmation.

1. Who May Modify

The first problem is who has standing to modify a confirmed plan. In chapter 13, the debtor, the trustee, or a holder of an unsecured claim may seek to modify the plan. Under new § 1127(e), the same group

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175. Id.
176. Id. § 321(a)(1), 119 Stat. at 94–95 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1115)).
177. Id. § 321(d)(2), 119 Stat. at 95 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(5)).
would seem to be empowered to seek a change.\textsuperscript{179} The difference is that the changes to chapter 11 did not pick up the changes made to § 1329, which now permits modification to enable the debtor to pay necessary health insurance premiums.\textsuperscript{180} In addition, secured creditors are not given standing to seek modification,\textsuperscript{181} although they often bear the brunt of the long-term changes effected by chapter 11 plans.

2. \textit{The “Hardship” Discharge}

Of more interest is the opportunity for a chapter 11 individual debtor to obtain a discharge before completing plan payments. Under chapter 13, such a discharge is possible, but it covers only unsecured debts not subject to nondischargeability under § 523.\textsuperscript{182} More importantly, the debtor must show that the “failure to complete [plan] payments is due to circumstances for which the debtor should not justly be held accountable,” and that “modification of the plan under section 1329 of this title is not practicable.”\textsuperscript{183}

The chapter 11 analogue to this provision omits two parts. First, it does not grant a lesser discharge; there is no exception for debts covered by § 523(a).\textsuperscript{184} Second, the provision drops the first part to the two conditions for discharge—that the debtor should not justly be held accountable for failure to complete payments—but keeps the second, making the early discharge turn on whether modification is “not practicable.”\textsuperscript{185} At

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{179} See BAPCPA § 321(e), 119 Stat. at 96 (codified in part at 11 U.S.C. § 1127(e)).
\textsuperscript{180} BAPCPA added a fourth paragraph to § 1329(a) that allows the modification of a chapter 13 plan to:

\begin{itemize}
  \item[(4)] reduce amounts to be paid under the plan by the actual amount expended by the debtor to purchase health insurance for the debtor (and for any dependent of the debtor if such dependent does not otherwise have health insurance coverage) if the debtor documents the cost of such insurance and demonstrates that—
    \begin{itemize}
      \item[(A)] such expenses are reasonable and necessary;
      \item[(B)(i)] if the debtor previously paid for health insurance, the amount is not materially larger than the cost the debtor previously paid or the cost necessary to maintain the lapsed policy; or
      \item[(B)(ii)] if the debtor did not have health insurance, the amount is not materially larger than the reasonable cost that would be incurred by a debtor who purchases health insurance, who has similar income, expenses, age, and health status, and who lives in the same geographical location with the same number of dependents who do not otherwise have health insurance coverage; and
      \item[(C)] the amount is not otherwise allowed for purposes of determining disposable income under section 1325(b) of this title;
    \end{itemize}

and upon request of any party in interest, files proof that a health insurance policy was purchased.

\textsuperscript{181} Id. § 102(i)(3), 119 Stat. at 34–35.
\textsuperscript{183} Id. § 1328(b)(1), (3).
\textsuperscript{184} This is likely not a drafting glitch. The scope of the discharge for individuals in chapter 11 has always been coextensive with the discharge in chapter 7, and thus the debts listed in § 523(a) have always been nondischargeable in chapter 11. Only in chapter 13, with its former “super” discharge, would the issue have arisen.
this point, it is unclear what sort of logic was behind the omission—it cannot be the view that chapter 11 confirmation is administratively easier than confirmation in chapter 13. For one thing, chapter 11 still requires disclosure to each impaired creditor and the opportunity for each such creditor to vote.\textsuperscript{186} Perhaps the thought was that before using this section, the debtor would have to propose a plan that was not accepted. However, given the relatively Draconian provisions for dismissal if one cannot confirm a plan, this would seem to require too much.

V. CONCLUSION

As examined in this article, BAPCPA amended chapter 11 in five places and in ways that directly affect individuals. These few changes, however, have deep and wide-reaching ripple effects. Post-BAPCPA administration and confirmation of an individual’s chapter 11 plan will significantly and substantially differ from the administration and confirmation of other chapter 11 plans. Indeed, given the interrelatedness of chapter 11’s provisions, the full extent of these changes may not be known for a long time.

Form should follow function. The significant changes to chapter 11 should have been reflected in the structure of the Bankruptcy Code. Congress had a ready and simple tool to reflect these changes: the subchapter. For its own reasons, however, Congress chose not to use this device, which is difficult to understand. Congress has previously made effective use of the subchapter within the Bankruptcy Code, especially in the treatment of other subclasses of debtors such as railroads and stockbrokers.

The failure to use a common and simple drafting tool—the subchapter—to organize the new provisions will have the untoward effect of increasing the incubation period of understanding for thousands of individual chapter 11 debtors. Participants in the bankruptcy system deserved better.

\footnote{both the chapter 11 chapter and 13 discharges require that the plan have paid at least liquidation value to unsecured creditors).

\textsuperscript{186} Or it might. At first glance, § 1127(f) would appear to make §§ 1121–1128, and the requirements of § 1129 applicable to all modifications. The qualifier to this provision, however, refers to “any modification under subsection (a).” BAPCPA § 321(e). Subsection (a), however, only applies to preconfirmation modification, thus leaving open the question of whether these sections apply to postconfirmation modifications.