Barricading the Nuclear Window — A legal Regime to Curtail Nuclear Smuggling
Barry Kellman & David S. Gualtieri | 1996 U. Ill. L. Rev.
Nuclear smuggling is perceived widely to be a serious security threat. Seizures of bomb-quality material are becoming frequent, leading to concerns that even more material is passing unseen. This article undertakes to formulate and organize legal responses to that threat. First, modalities of international arms control should be employed to reduce the availability of nuclear materials to smugglers, substantially increasing the cost of pursuing a clandestine weapons program and raising the chance of revealing their criminal plot. Second modalities of international criminal law enforcement should be employed to investigate, apprehend, and prosecute those who engage in illicit weapons activities. The colossal quantity of nuclear material, the widespread awareness of weapons design, and the propagation of global criminal networks, together, manifest a need for a comprehensive international response. This article offers nineteen recommendations for an integrated legal regime in which arms control and criminal law enforcement--two previously unrelated branches of international law--can be implemented explicitly for maximum efficacy.
* Professor, DePaul University College of Law. B.A. 1973, University of Chicago; J.D. 1976, Yale.
** Consultant, Argonne National Laboratory. B.A. 1989, University of Michigan; J.D. 1992, DePaul University; LL.M. 1996, Harvard.